Like the original Spencer-Brander result, the R&D incentives that we identify lead governments to set positive R&D subsides in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, we find that if exporting governments could cooperate over their policy choices they would continue to subsidize R&D, rather...

This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain why governments seek restrictions on IPR protection and allow R&D subsidies through multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. After 7 years of discussion, the...

This paper is useful in that it succeeds in identifying and characterizing the interesting effects that exogenous variation in the degree of IPR protection can have on standard strategic trade policy arguments. In pointing out the importance of the IPR regime for understanding, the incentives to...

In this paper we attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of academic research and patenting in India. Academic research is conceptualised as a research production process where research inputs (like research time and number of research scholars) are transformed into...

The question of protecting intellectual property rights by academic inventors was never seriously contemplated until the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 in the US. The Act allowed universities to retain patent rights over inventions arising out of federally-funded research and to...

The spread of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Southeast Asia has ignited a debate about their impact on business, and ways to avoid raising the business costs from the Asian ‘noodle bowl’ effect. This paper undertakes a comparative and firm-level analysis of the impact of RTAs...

The spread of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Southeast Asia has ignited a debate about their impact on business, and ways to avoid raising the business costs from the Asian ‘noodle bowl’ effect. This paper undertakes a comparative and firm-level analysis of the impact of RTAs...