This statement outlines the objectives and policies of the new journal, Macroeconomic Dynamics, which is dedicated to the advancement of macroeconomics as a science. This Editorial is to appear at the front of the first issue of that journal and is copyright by Cambridge University Press.

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task­-assignment model, and wages are determined through multi­lateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through...

The article analyzes the Dynkin (1975) stochastic model of economic equilibrium. We solve a question regarding this model that was open for a long time. We provide arguments yielding a complete proof of Dynkin's existence theorem for equilibrium paths.

We consider optimization problems with second order stochastic dominance constraints formulated as a relation of Lorenz curves. We characterize the relation in terms of rank dependent utility functions, which generalize Yaari's utility functions. We develop optimality conditions and duality...

Let M and N be the set of minimizers of a function f over respective subsets K and L of a lattice, with K being lower than L. This paper characterizes the class of functions f for which M is lower (resp., weakly lower, meet lower, join lower, chain lower) than N for all K lower than L. The...