Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such...

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

Contracts providing payments for not developing natural areas, or for removing cropland from production, generally require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost of complying with conservation requirements increases....

This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their...

This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust between buyers and suppliers in the retail industry. Building upon the notion of the spirit of the technology and the organizing vision, we shed light on the "equivoque" nature of...

This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust between buyers and suppliers in the retail industry. Building upon the notion of the spirit of the technology and the organizing vision, we shed light on the "equivoque" nature of...