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Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents

Ratto, Marisa; Vergé, Thibaud - EconWPA - 2003

Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412503

Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions

Humphery-Jenner, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). While some literature has examined SEC actions, it has not examined SCAs, and has not examined...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092569

Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We provide experimental evidence of workers’ ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers’ discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers’ performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858024

Aging and Attitudes Towards Strategic Uncertainty and Competition: An Artefactual Field Experiment in a Swiss Bank

Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie-Claire; Wasmer, Malgorzata - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858028

Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858030

Bubbles and Incentives : An Experiment on Asset Markets

Robin, Stéphane; Straznicka, Katerina; Villeval, Marie … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and trading activity in experimental asset markets. We compare i) a no-bonus treatment based on Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) ; ii) a short-term bonus treatment in which bonuses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858034

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037

Dishonesty under scrutiny

Ven, Jeroen van de; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942938

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784

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