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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006
maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247882
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Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment
Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086286
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Punishment, Inequality and Emotions
Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006
paper reports the results of an experiment investigating inequality aversion and negative emotions as possible determinants …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086287
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Reducing overreaction to central banks’ disclosures : theory and experiment
Baeriswyl, Romain; Cornand, Camille - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011
reducing the degree of transparency. We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a game … played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow the formulation of a clear preference in favor of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391827
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Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive : Experimental Evidence
Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010
be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460678
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Intermittent Reinforcement and the Persistence of Behavior: Experimental Evidence
Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010
-effort experiment in which individuals had to decide when to exit the situation : a continuous reinforcement schedule (all periods paid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506223
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Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects
Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2009
prospects in a laboratory experiment. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking behavior for small probabilities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008471892
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The Ratio Bias Phenomenon : Fact or Artifact ?
Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2009
The ratio bias -according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers- has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008471893
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Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence
Arbak, Emrah; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007
lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056850
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Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods
Levy-Garboua, Louis; Montmarquette, Claude; Villeval, … - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007
experiment based on a game in the first stage of which subjects can voluntarily contribute to the funding of a collective good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029820