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Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents

Ratto, Marisa; Vergé, Thibaud - EconWPA - 2003

Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412503

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2006

maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247882

Public Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy

Gueth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Pantz, Katinka; Sutter, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

Direct democracy with its use of referenda avoids the prototypical principal-agent problems of delegation in indirect democracies, especially since elected representatives are usually not committed by law to keep their promises. Sequential or more complex referenda may, however, result in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252203

The excess burden of tax evasion – An experimental detection-concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph-C; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities, investing costly effort in concealment, respectively detect ion, of tax evasion. We show that (socially inefficient) efforts depend positively on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824115

Tournaments for the endogenous allocating of prizes within workteams - Theory and experimental evidence

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

proposer rotates in the order of members' efforts. We show in an experiment that tournaments elicit higher efforts than random …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765090

Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining

Brosig, Jeannette; Ockenfels, Axel; Weimann, Joachim - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2003

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic pre-play communication (no, one-way, and two-way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargaining out-comes are influenced by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765095

The Effect of Group Identity in an Investment Game

Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Levati, Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

The present research experimentally examines the influence of group identity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial (minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionally related by outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765104

Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2007

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765125

Age and the development of trust and reciprocity

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust and reciprocity have been identified as fundamental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765128