An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare; I address it by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker’s income and consumer’s monitoring ability and positively with...

This paper is the Italian version of “Measuring Social Capital in Italy”, presented at the Third Forum for Young Researchers promoted by the Italian Sociological Association and at the Second Workshop for Young Economists organized by the University of Bologna. The contribution of this paper...

This paper is the Italian version of “Measuring Social Capital in Italy”, presented at the Third Forum for Young Researchers promoted by the Italian Sociological Association and at the Second Workshop for Young Economists organized by the University of Bologna. The contribution of this paper...

We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when...

Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates whether indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected observers can increase contributions to a public good. The experiment has two treatment...

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge...