different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …

coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game<br/>has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient … condition for a sequencing<br/>game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time<br/>algorithm to …

nite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payof each player must receive. The core of an NTU … guarantee that the Shapley value, being the average of all marginal vectors of the game, is an element of the core. Convexity of … elements of the core. As solution concept for NTU-games we propose a set of solutions that is determined by the average of all …

convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An …

-building set. Properties of this solution are also studied. To establish core stability we introduce appropriate convexity …

of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined.It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the …

corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that these games have a non-empty core and thus allow for stable allocations …

that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided. …

jobs. Using nonstandard techniques we prove that each family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a … particular marginal vector belongs to the core. Finally, we specifically analyze the case in which the initial order is family …