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Three-valued simple games
Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke; Musegaas, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2015
different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268490
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Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games
Borm, Peter; Ciftci, B.B.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006
A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path.A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player's payoff does not decrease as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091740