This paper provides a within-country analysis of the impact of corruption on economic growth using a panel of Italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a robust measure of corruption. This measure is averaged over 5-year periods to reduce short-run fluctuations and to reduce probable delayed...

This paper examines the influence of government transparency on changing views regarding nuclear energy before and after Japan’s natural and nuclear disaster of 2011. Individual level data were used, covering 45 countries and containing 27,423 observations. It was observed in the majority of...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necesarily know the supervisor’s preferences.We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

Using cross-country data, this paper investigates how governance influenced views regarding the security of nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident in Japan. Key findings are: (1) citizens are less likely to agree that nuclear power plants are properly secured against accidents with the...

Using cross-country data, this paper examines the influence of government transparency on changing views regarding nuclear energy before and after Japan’s natural and nuclear disasters of 2011. It was observed that in the majority of countries the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after...

This paper builds on Faure-Grimaud and Martimort’s [Economics Letters 71 (2001) 75-82] analysis of intermediated contracting. I argue that intermediated contracting permits one form of auditing, in which the sub-contract offered to the firm is examined, contingent on the intermediary’s...

There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions to a better-informed agent but does not choose to give full discretion. This paper discusses one reason why this might be desirable: the agent may have tastes that differ from those of the principal. Limiting the agent's...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...