Showing 1 - 10 of 17
This paper builds on Faure-Grimaud and Martimort’s [Economics Letters 71 (2001) 75-82] analysis of intermediated contracting. I argue that intermediated contracting permits one form of auditing, in which the sub-contract offered to the firm is examined, contingent on the intermediary’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135017
When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077052
Suppose an altruistic person, A, is willing to transfer resources to a second person, B, if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents' point of view. This is the Samaritan's dilemma. The logic of the dilemma has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077070
This paper discusses a model where consumers simultaneously differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable characteristic (location). In these circumstances nonlinear prices arise in equilibrium. The main question addressed in this work is whether firms should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077081
low value. Contrary to the theory, buyers are inclined to bid less when they learn they have the high value. Consistent … with theory, the overall proportion of efficient allocations is lower than in the first- price auction before information … regular basis, contrary to the theory’s predictions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134975
We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder - the speculator - has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134987
Consider an auction in which $k$ identical objects are sold to $nk$ bidders who each have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it. Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and bidders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078
This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals' endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135122
Among practitioners, inventory is often thought to be the root of all evil in operations management. The stock market hates it, the media abhors it, and managers have come to fear it. But high inventory levels can also be the result of strategic buying and high-availability strategies. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413245
In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413249