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Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price

Elbittar, A. Alexander - EconWPA - 2005

low value. Contrary to the theory, buyers are inclined to bid less when they learn they have the high value. Consistent … with theory, the overall proportion of efficient allocations is lower than in the first- price auction before information … regular basis, contrary to the theory’s predictions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134975

Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale

Troger, Thomas - EconWPA - 2003

We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder - the speculator - has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134987

Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information

Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2002

Consider an auction in which $k$ identical objects are sold to $nk$ bidders who each have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it. Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078

General Equilibrium with Endogenous Securities and Moral Hazard

Braido, Luis H. B. - EconWPA - 2004

This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals' endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135122

Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

Laureti, Paolo; Slanina, Frantisek; Yu, Yi-Kuo; Zhang, … - EconWPA - 2003

We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407517

Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention

Hirshleifer, David; LIM, SONYA SEONGYEON; Teoh, Siew Hong - EconWPA - 2004

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407521

The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information

Dhami, Sanjit - EconWPA - 2001

This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407535

Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement

Nicolo', Antonio; Tedeschi, Piero - EconWPA - 2004

Many couples do not sign prenuptial agreements, even though this often leads to costly and inefficient litigation in case of divorce. In this paper we show that strategic reasons may prevent agents from signing a prenuptial agreement. Partners which have high productivity in marital activities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407538

Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game

Harrison, Rodrigo J.; Munoz, Roberto - EconWPA - 2003

extension of the global game theory that can be applied beyond network literature. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407549

Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring

Bhaskar, V.; Damme, Eric van - EconWPA - 1998

We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407576