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Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship

Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firmâ€™s costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140957

Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Us- ing tools from non-smooth analysis and optimal control, we derive best responses and characterize equilibria (both continuous and discontinuous) using self-generating opti- mization programs of which any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251555

Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains

Fiocco, Raffaele; Guo, Dongyu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

In an industry where regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers, we investigate the welfare effects of a merger between regulated firms when cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged firm. The optimal merger policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252548

Why is the Workplace Racially Segregated by Occupation?

Naqvi, Nadeem - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

by economic theory, but “the hypothesis of employer discrimination does not at all explain segregation by occupation … theory foundations, insofar as they impose a utility indicator function as a primitive concept via persuasion, rather than … to discriminate. Economic theory is, therefore, endogenously color-blind, race-blind, gender-blind, ethnicity-blind, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260187

Employer’s moral hazard and wage rigidity

albanese, marina; navarra, cecilia; Tortia, Ermanno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

The standard explanation of wage rigidity in principal agent and in efficiency wage models is related to worker risk-aversion. However, these explanations do not consider at least two important classes of empirical evidence: (1) In worker cooperatives workers appear to behave in a less risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260540

A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO

Weiss, Pia - EconWPA - 2002

When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077052

Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate

Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on `expert advice.' Such advice typically originates in a due diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint venture's profitability, for example, by appraising the achievability of synergies. We show that if the experts who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295282

Inventory Signals

Lai, Richard - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

also provide empirical evidence for this theory that inventory has a signaling role. The theory could potentially provide a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836353

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490447

Co-operative and competitive enforced self regulation: the role of governments, private actors and banks in corporate responsibility

Ojo, Marianne - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

encouraged, this paper highlights criticisms attributed to government control of banks. However the theory relating to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498483