Similar Search Results

Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

CONSUMER SEARCH: NOT ENOUGH OR TOO MUCH?

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon; Lo, Alison King Chung; … - EconWPA - 2001

We study search behavior in a generalized "secretary problem" environment in which consumers search sequentially for the best alternative from a known and finite set of multi-attribute alternatives. In contrast to most previous studies, we make no distributional assumptions about the quality of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408222

Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon - EconWPA - 1999

Tacit coordination is studied experimentally in a class of iterated market entry games with a relatively small number of potential entrants (n = 6), symmetric players, and fixed entry fees. These games are intended to simulate a situation where a newly emergent market opportunity may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408234

Individual Preferences for Giving

Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel - EconWPA - 2005

This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich data set well- suited to studying behavior at the level of the individual subject. We test the data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118605