We propose a Bayesian methodology that enables banks to improve their credit scoring models by imposing prior information. As prior information, we use coefficients from credit scoring models estimated on other data sets. Through simulations, we explore the default prediction power of three...

Various noninformative prior distributions have been suggested for scale parameters in hierarchical models. We construct a new folded-noncentral- t family of conditionally conjugate priors for hierarchical standard deviation parameters, and then consider noninformative and weakly informative...

Explained variance (R^2) is a familiar summary of the fit of a linear regression and has been generalized in various ways to multilevel (hierarchical) models. The multilevel models we consider in this paper are characterized by hierarchical data structures in which individuals are grouped into...

In this paper we consider bayesian semiparametric regression within the generalized linear model framework. Specifically, we study a class of autoregressive time series where the time trend is incorporated in a nonparametrically way. Estimation and inference where performed through Markov Chain...

This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played...

What modern game theorists describe as 'fictitious play' is not the learning process George W. Brown defined in his 1951 paper. His original version differs in a subtle detail, namely the order of belief updating. In this note we revive Brown's original fictitious play process and demonstrate...

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...

Fictitious play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for some important classes of games, including weighted potential games, supermodular games...

It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2x2 and 2x3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2xn games. We give a simple geometric proof of this.