Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the...

The paper provides an brief overview of the “state of the art” in the theory of rational decision making since the 1950’s, and focuses specially on the evolutionary justification of rationality. It is claimed that this justification, and more generally the economic methodology inherited...

Asset prices are forward looking. This evidence implies that prices of financial assets are essentially determined by the traders expectations about future prices. Another evidence about asset prices is that these do not seem to follow a predictable pattern over time; we observe periods of high...

This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous ­time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model (``automated sellers'') maximize the seller's expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief...

In recent years, understanding the structure and function of complex networks has become the foundation for explaining many different real- world complex biological, technological and informal social phenomena. Techniques from statistical physics have been successfully applied to the analysis of...

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing...

We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information: the valuation equilibrium. The moves of each player are partitioned into similarity classes. A valuation of the player is a real valued function on the set of her similarity classes. At each node a player...

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Economic agency as a matter of rational decision-making and as a problem of bounded rationality has never gone too far from its earlier formalization in the 1950s. Not that the advancement on this topic is so slow, but the same problem concerning higher level cognition as another general program...

Corruption has been an important issue as it becomes obstacle to achieve the better and more efficient economic governmental system. The paper defines corruption in two ways, as state capture and administrative corruption to grasp the quintessence of the corruption cases modeled in dynamical...