In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions

In this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.

In this paper I give a new proof of equilibrium existence in incomplete markets economies with a continuum of states.

We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show via examples and our existence result that, in general,...

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies in...

We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer...

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Suppose a seller wants to sell $k$ similar or identical objects and there are $nk$ potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want only one object. (This is a reasonable assumption in the sale of condominiums or in the sale of government-owned residential units to low-income families). In this case,...

In this note I explictly construct utility functions that (more or less) satisfy the conditions needed for the counterexample of Mas-Colell and Zame(1992)