This paper analyzes the incentives for governments to impose export subsidies when firms invest in a cost saving technology before market competition. Governments first impose an export subsidy or a tax. After observing export policy, firms invest in cost reducing R&D and subsequently compete in...

This paper studies steady-state, Markov-Perfect strategic trade policy when (infinitely lived) governments are committed to trade policy during two periods. We compare the case in which both governments choose their export subsidies in the same periods (synchronization) versus the case in which...

In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and...

We study the effect of market structure upon international trade policy when firms invest in process R&D before competing in a differentiated goods market. For a domestic monopoly, and increasing the number of foreign firms, the government either chooses a R&D (and output) subsidy, or remains...

A stylized pattern of interindustry trade between developing and developed regions identifies the former as specialists in light manufactures and latter in heavy manufactures. Conventional explanations for this pattern rely on the factor proportions model, which is empirically suspect. This...

In general equilibrium models with oligopolistic firms, equilibrium outcomes may depend on the choice of numeraire. When firms have the power to influence prices strategically, different price normalisations entail objective profit functions which are generally not monotone transformations of...

The paper considers the legacy for modern macroeconomics of Kalecki’s theory of income determination. The latter is reconstructed in its analytical constituent parts referring in detail to the original sources. The critical appraisal of its historical relevance is made from the vantage point...

We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any...

We analyze the role of imperfect competition in explaining the relationship between temporary surges in trade-volumes and the level of cooperation in trade policy that can be sustained between countries in a repeated game framework. Imperfectly competitive markets are characterized by a mark-up...

The paper studies equilibria for economies with imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. Following Negishi firms maximise profits under downward-sloping perceived demand functions. Negishi's assumptions, in particular the assumption of a single monopolistic competitor in each market,...