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This paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation. Agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market, can belong to several clubs, and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs. The space of agents is a continuum, but clubs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077047
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125659
Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games with perfect recall are Selten's (1975) {\it perfect equilibrium\/} and Kreps and Wilson's (1982) more inclusive {\it sequential equilibrium\/}. These two equilibrium refinements are motivated in very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407588
We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information: the valuation equilibrium. The moves of each player are partitioned into similarity classes. A valuation of the player is a real valued function on the set of her similarity classes. At each node a player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550956
A valuation for a board game is an assignment of numeric values to different states of the board. The valuation reflects the desirability of the states for the player. It can be used by a player to decide on her next move during the play. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118654