I consider the private provision of public goods in two stage games. If the agent who likes the public good least contributes first, the amount of the public good supplied will be the same as in the Nash equilibrium. If the agent who likes the public good most contributes first, less of the...

This paper was prepared for the conference ``Public Access to the Internet,'' JFK School of Government, May 26--27 , 1993. We describe some of the technology and costs relevant to pricing access to and usage of the Internet, and discuss the components of an efficient pricing structure. We...

This is a preliminary version of a paper prepared for the Tenth Michigan Public Utility Conference at Western Michigan University March 25--27, 1992. We describe the history, technology and cost structure of the Internet. We also describe a possible smart-market mechanism for pricing traffic on...

I examine the incentives for software providers to design appropriate user interfaces. There are two sorts of costs involved when one uses software: the fixed cost of learning to use a piece of software and the the variable cost of operating the software. For example menu driven software is easy...

I examine how neoclassical economic theory is useful to the understanding of economic policy. I also describe what I view as the role of economic theory in economics. This talk was prepared for the conference ``Is Economics Becoming a Hard Science?'' 29--30 October, 1992, Paris, France.

I describe a goodness-of-fit measure for revealed preference tests. This index can be used to measure the degree to which an economic agent violates the model of utility maximization. I calculate the violation indices for a 38 consumers and find that the observed choice behavior is very close to...

This is a set of Frequently Asked Questions (and answers) about the economic, institutional, and technological structure of the Internet. We describe the history and current state of the Internet, discuss some of the pressing economic and regulatory problems, and speculate about future developments.

The popular press attaches particular significance to certain numerical values of the Dow-Jones index. These magic numbers are referred to as `resistance levels' or `psychological barriers.' We examine 38 years of closing values of this index to see if it is of any help in predicting future...

Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with individual consumers. This paper investigates conditions under which price conditioning will or will not be used. Our simplest model involves rational...

I describe a simple two-stage mechanism, the compensation mechanism, that implements efficient allocations in economic environments involving externalities. The compensation mechanism can be used to solve a wide variety of externalities problems, including the standard problem of public goods...