In this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...

We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show via examples and our existence result that, in general,...

We make two main contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if agents’ preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained...

We model the agenda formation process as a network. In an agenda network, nodes represent agendas while arcs represent coalition preferences over agendas and coalitional moves from one agenda to another. We show that all agenda networks have agenda nodes which are farsightedly consistent. These...