When the home country introduces a patent law after the winner of the patent race is known the country's welfare may rise only if the domestic firm wins. If the home country decides before the patent race ends, the welfare may be increased when the probability that the domestic firm wins is...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for...

The existence of a ‘bidding market’ is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that effect: the ‘consultants’ fallacy’ that ‘market power is impossible’, the ‘academics’...

The ''portfolio effect theory'' developed by the European Commission in merger control is at the center of a fierce international row with the US authorities who believe that this theory has no economic foundations. This paper aims to provide a counter-argument and shows that full-line forcing...

This paper considers the integration of competition policy and innovation policy in the context of R&D cooperation. An explicit comparison of the welfare losses under ex-ante and ex-post R&D cooperation reveals differing incentives to undertake R&D in both regimes. The strength of these...

In a model of sequential patent races, it is examined whether or not introducing a patent law in the home country is beneficial to the firms and the society as a whole given the foreign country already offers patent protection. Before the first patent race starts, the firms and the foreign...

On 28 August 1998 the Treasurer referred the impact of competition policy reforms on rural an regional Australia for inquiry and report within 12 months of receiving the reference. The Commission is to assess the impact (both transitional and ongoing) of the competition policy and related...