We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties....

The belief that equality of demand and supply determines price and clears the market is universal. Shockingly, this belief is unfounded. It contradicts macro’s claim that equality of demand and supply determines output. It contradicts (new) monetary theory, which claims that equality of demand...

If each member of a group assigns a certain probability to a hypothesis, what probability should the collective as a whole assign? More generally, how should individual probability functions be merged into a single collective one? I investigate this question in case that the individual...

We conduct an event analysis on OPEC quota announcements to determine their impact on the stock returns in the oil industry. We find that announcements to reduce the quota are followed by positive excess returns over pre-announcement levels, announcements of no action are met with negative...

Is it always wise to disclose good news? When both the sender and the receiver have private information about the sender's quality, we find that the worst sender type with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the...

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....

Negli anni novanta si è diffusa nelle scienze sociali l’idea che la crescita non sia determinata soltanto da fattori di carattere economico, quali il capitale naturale, il capitale fisico e il capitale umano, ma anche dal tessuto sociale e istituzionale dell’economia. Gli aspetti della...

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem shows that transitive social preference is impossible. This note shows that in the general case of exchange, social preference need not be transitive. Indeed, it shows that social preference must be non-transitive to allow gainful exchange to maximize social...