I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties....

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated...

An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In...

We present a dynamic term structure model in which interest rates of all maturities are bounded from below at zero. Positivity and continuity, combined with no arbitrage, result in only one functional form for the term structure with three sources of risk. One dynamic factor controls the level...

We propose two generalizations of the Davis Maschler reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

The conditions under which ordinary least squares (OLS) is an unbiased and consistent estimator of the linear probability model (LPM) are unlikely to hold in many instances. Yet the LPM still may be the correct model or, perhaps, justified for practical reasons. A sequential least squares (SLS)...