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Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609

Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

The results of Ultimatum Game experiments are often quoted as evidence for the role of fairness in bargaining or in … of pairs of players shows that different types of players coexist in the subject pool. Whereas previous experiments found …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408237

Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

This paper reports experimental evidence on behaviour in an Ultimatum Game where responders have low structural information and feedback so that they have to learn the nature of the game during repeated play. The results lend support to the view that certain learning conditions are less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125583

An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2002

In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889

Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates

Berliant, Marcus; Konishi, Hideo - EconWPA - 2004

simultaneously, announcing any positions they choose on any issues. To us, salience is simply the discussion of an issue in a … campaign. If both candidates and voters are expected utility maximizers, we find salience results, in that candidates typically …-Schmeidler to illustrate how robust nonsalience and salience of issues might be generated. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118536

Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

game of mutual fate control, while earlier psychologists' experiments show some tendency to convergence. Our rivalling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon; Lo, Alison King Chung - EconWPA - 2001

We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408213

To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - EconWPA - 1999

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408230

Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices

Riechmann, Thomas - EconWPA - 2005

This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062347

Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Riechmann, Thomas; Weimann, Joachim - EconWPA - 2004

rather classical economic institution: competition. In a series of laboratory experiments, we reveal that the true reason for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352