I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, I focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms.

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...

A new integral for capacities, different from the Choquet integral, is introduced and characterized. The main feature of the new integral is concavity, which might be interpreted as uncertainty aversion. The integral is then extended to fuzzy capacities, which assign subjective expected values...

The "Weakest Link" is a game show full of paradox. To increase the probability of winning, contestants should eliminate the strongest players. Yet, if it is anticipated that the best player is to be eliminated, participants do not answer questions correctly and nothing is gained. We solve a game...

Analyzing scanner price data that cover 27 product categories over an eight-year period from a large Mid-western supermarket chain, we uncover a surprising regularity in the data—small price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases. We find that this asymmetry holds for price...

This paper starts with an overview of the current literature on the cost of price risk exposure to developing country farmers. It then discusses market-based price risk management instruments (such as futures and options) that can be used by farmers, as well as various mechanisms through which...

Recent studies in information economics demonstrated that asymmetric information existing between market agents induce a lost in efficiency as well as market failures. This paper aims to draw heavily from these theoretical intuitions in order to analyse the individual sports’ environment. The...

I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits....