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Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equilibrium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This paper reports an experimental test of Edgeworth exchange which demonstrates that prices and allocations converge sharply to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077054
This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124959
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125563
Landberger et al. (2001) identified optimal bidder behavior in first- price private-value auctions when the ranking of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134975
demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more aggressive bidding. On the other hand, since collusion decreases …®ects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions with constant informational content but a varying number of bidders among whom this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407619
This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous ­time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model (``automated sellers'') maximize the seller's expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413252
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413287
aversion model and to study the importance of information feedback in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions. The data reveal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556692
We construct Edgeworth exchange economies equivalent to demand and supply environments typically used in bargaining models and market experiments. This formulation clearly delineates environment, institution, and behavior for these models and experiments. To illustrate, we examine results by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561849
(forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076990