Similar Search Results

Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

The results of Ultimatum Game experiments are often quoted as evidence for the role of fairness in bargaining or in … economic behaviour more generally. This paper argues that the observed fairness levels are contingent on the traditional … experiment shows that average behaviour is more competitive and conflict rates are higher when subjects play against the same …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408237

Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

lack structural information, which contrasts with common notions of fairness or "manners" in ultimatum bargaining (Camerer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125583

Learning in Economics: Where Do We Stand?

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 2000

critically compares theory with aspects of learning in real-life and with evidence from laboratory experiments, and argues that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413284

A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

In economics, adjustment of behavior has traditionally been treated as a "black box." Recent approaches that focus on learning behavior try to model, test, and simulate specific adjustment mechanisms in specific environments (mostly in games). Results often critically depend on distinctive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135048

Individual Preferences for Giving

Fisman, Raymond; Kariv, Shachar; Markovits, Daniel - EconWPA - 2005

This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich data set well- suited to studying behavior at the level of the individual subject. We test the data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118605

Expected utility without utility

Castagnoli, Erio; LiCalzi, Marco - EconWPA - 2005

This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann–Morgenstern’s expected utility model for preferences over lotteries which does not require the notion of a cardinal utility over prizes and can be phrased entirely in the language of probability. According to it, the expected utility of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118603

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609

The Individual Behavior in a Public Goods game

HICHRI, Walid - EconWPA - 2005

Generally, with a standard linear public goods game, one observes at the aggregate level that contributions lay between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and decrease over time with an end-effect.Our purpose is to see whether these general aggregate results remain available at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408225

Comparison of Mean-Variance theory and Expected-Utility theory through a Laboratory Experiment

Morone, Andrea - EconWPA - 2004

In the 40’s and early 50’ two decision theories were proposed and have since dominated the scene of the fascinating field of decision-making. In 1944 – when von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408229

Time preferences: do they matter in bargaining?

Manzini, Paola - EconWPA - 2001

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408236