Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change...

This paper provides textual evidence of Keynes´s position on monetary policy and shaping international monetary relations. One result of my contribution is that the famous dichotomy 'rules versus discretion' is of no relevance to his economic theory, because he used the term 'rules' not in the...

This paper provides an overview of central banking arrangements in those European countries that have adopted the euro. Issues addressed include the structure of the “Eurosystem” and its central banking functions, the kind of independence granted to the system and the role of monetary policy...

DNB bewaakt de stabiliteit van ons financiële stelsel via het monetaire beleid, het toezicht en de zorg voor het betalingsverkeer. Deze gezamenlijke taakuitoefening biedt belangrijke voordelen.

Woodford’s (2003) model of a cashless economy is the basis for his book Interest and Prices. Since Woodford assumes complete markets, this paper explicitly includes state-contingent securities with either temporary money or a cash-in-advance constraint to analyze Woodford’s logic. This...

(forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its...

Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equilibrium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This paper reports an experimental test of Edgeworth exchange which demonstrates that prices and allocations converge sharply to the...

In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...

Auctions used to sell houses often attract a diverse group of bidders, with realtors and speculators out for a bargain competing against buyers with a real interest in the house. Value asymmetries such as these necessitate careful consideration of the auction format as revenue equivalence cannot...

This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model...