Showing 1 - 10 of 91
We look at a job-market model of bilateral uncertainty. Workers are uncertain about what job descriptions advertised by firms really mean and firms are uncertain about the qualifications of workers before they are interviewed. Both types of uncertainty can be resolved but both processes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407591
We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118596
A number of products that display positive network effects are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, web services and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network effects are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561494
(forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076990
Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equilibrium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This paper reports an experimental test of Edgeworth exchange which demonstrates that prices and allocations converge sharply to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077054
In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077062
Auctions used to sell houses often attract a diverse group of bidders, with realtors and speculators out for a bargain competing against buyers with a real interest in the house. Value asymmetries such as these necessitate careful consideration of the auction format as revenue equivalence cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077067
This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124959
A repo auction is a multi-unit common value auction in which bidders submit demand functions. Such auctions are used by the Bundesbank as well as the European Central Bank as the principal instrument for implementing monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze a repo auction with a uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124996
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125563