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This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in alternating move repeated games with two players. Such … attention on Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). These are Perfect equilibria in which individuals condition their actions on … payoff-relevant state variables. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550884
This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the … number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550934
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118581
The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118607
To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have proposed a profit-sharing mechanism that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561433
To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have proposed a profit- sharing mechanism that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412990
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927
equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556698