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Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

(lexicographically) costly, all protocols admit only equilibria that sustain stage Nash equilibrium payoffs. We also analyze a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603

The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information

Miller, David A. - EconWPA - 2005

lower valuation. Under independent valuations, optimal equilibria are often stationary, but when valuations are globally … interdependent, optimal equilibria are never stationary. Applied to the problem of collusion with hidden costs, these results yield … new insights into the phenomenon of price wars in collusive equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608

Discrimination and job-uncertainty

Frijters, P. - EconWPA - 1997

In this paper I look at the possibility of encorporating group behaviour into a model of the labour market by showing that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for a scarce amount of jobs. Coalitions can form either on the basis of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408365

Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 1999

Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877

An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example

Oechssler, Jorg; Schlag, Karl - EconWPA - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927

Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001

equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938

Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle

Echenique, Federico - EconWPA - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556698

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2004

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118531

A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Herings, P.J.J.; Peeters, R. - EconWPA - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118534