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L’expérimentation en économie et en psychologie: une comparaison méthodologique.

Marc, Ohana - EconWPA - 2004

expérimentation en économie et en psychologie (incitation financière et utilisation de la tromperie), avant d’introduire ce qui nous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126094

Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency

Bac, Mehmet; Kucuksenel, Serkan - EconWPA - 2005

We introduce ex-ante collusion whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in addition to ex-post collusion following the monitoring outcome. Extending a well-known model of hierarchy, we study the determinants of ex-ante collusion and show that, depending on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118551

Efficient Mechanism Design

Krishna, Vijay; Perry, Motty - EconWPA - 1997

We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue'' among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118596

Incentives for Developing and Communicating Principles: A Reply

Armstrong, JS - EconWPA - 2005

emerges: The commentators claim that management science lacks the incentives to encourage efforts to develop and communicate … medical journals are scientifically sound. Such results indicate problems with incentives in research. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005119403

Firm Performance and Compensation Structure: Performance Elasticities of Average Employee Compensation

Rayton, Bruce A. - EconWPA - 1996

Agency costs are a cost of production, and firms that do a better job of minimizing these costs should exhibit better performance. This paper tests this hypothesis by calculating the performance elasticity of average employee hourly compensation for U.S. manufacturing firms. This elasticity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076551

Hidden Teacher Effort in Educational Production: Monitoring vs. Merit Pay

Jaag, Christian - EconWPA - 2005

This paper deals with the optimality of teacher incentive contracts in the presence of costly or limited government resources. It considers educational production under asymmetric information as a function of teacher effort and class size. In the presence of costly government resources and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076924

Initiative, Incentives and Soft Information. How Does Delegation Impact The Role of Bank Relationship Managers?

Liberti, Jose Maria - EconWPA - 2004

This paper empirically examines how changes in the hierarchical structure of a large organization can affect incentives … authority and reduction of oversight improves or decreases the provision of effort by account managers. Results suggest that … 'empowering managers' increases the time relationship managers spend with their corporate clients, increases perceived effort and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077034

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Fehr, Ernst - EconWPA - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077050

The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency

Jackson, Matthew O.; Sonnenschein, Hugo F. - EconWPA - 2003

For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077065

Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation

Rauh, Michael T.; Seccia, Giulio - EconWPA - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550897