Ideal economics? A “non-ideal” economics approach has been proposed, which considers the possibility of arrangement infringements. It gives promises for both solving fundamental problems of economic theory and creation of new directions and fields of research. The approach application in...

In the 40’s and early 50’ two decision theories were proposed and have since dominated the scene of the fascinating field of decision-making. In 1944 – when von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that if preferences are consistent with a set of axioms then it is possible to represent these...

In a discrete setting, we develop a model for pricing a contingent claim. Since the presence of hedging opportunities influences the price of a contingent claim, first we introduce the optimal hedging strategy assuming a contingent claim has been issued: a strategy implemented by investing the...

We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which combines an 'economic’ view of decision making - based on a rational, though incomplete, ordering - with a 'psychological’ view - based on heuristics. This theory can explain observed violations of EU theory, namely all cyclical...

This paper studies a target-based procedure to rank lotteries that is normatively and observationally equivalent to the expected utility model. In view of this equivalence, the traditional utility-based language for decision making may be substituted with an alternative target-based language....

This paper describes a parametric family of utility functions for decision analysis. The parameterization is obtained by embedding the HARA class in a four-parameter representation for the risk aversion function. The resulting utility functions have only four shapes: concave, convex, S-shaped,...

This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann–Morgenstern’s expected utility model for preferences over lotteries which does not require the notion of a cardinal utility over prizes and can be phrased entirely in the language of probability. According to it, the expected utility of a...

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of ``hide and seek.'' Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game...