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Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?
Dur, Robert A.J. - EconWPA - 1999
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076606
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Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation
Lagerlof, Johan; Frisell, Lars - EconWPA - 2004
his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076613
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Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives: The Case of Tipping
Azar, Ofer H. - EconWPA - 2003
are not provided by the firm), such as tips, satisfaction from working well, or the desire to build reputation in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125035
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A Prototype for an Agent-based Secure Electronic Marketplace including Reputation Tracking Mechanisms
Boris, Padovan; Stefan, Sackmann; Thorsten, Eymann; … - EconWPA - 2002
reputation of other, unknown agents. The multi-agent system AVALANCHE is a prototype for an agent-based secure electronic … commerce marketplace environment. The reputation tracking mechanism, which is implemented in AVALANCHE’s software agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134563
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Cooperation and Punishment
Thomas, Jonathan P.; Evans, Robert - EconWPA - 2000
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513
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Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation
Lagerlof, Johan; Frisell, Lars - EconWPA - 2004
his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413244
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Professional Advice
Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter - EconWPA - 1999
Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550867
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Evolutionary Stability in a Reputational Model of Bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Sethi, Rajiv - EconWPA - 2001
A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550888
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Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
Thomas, Jonathan P.; Cripps, Martin - EconWPA - 2000
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550893
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The Evolution of Trust and Reputation: Results from Simulation Experiments
Diekmann, Andreas; Przepiorka, Wojtek - EconWPA - 2005
trust and cooperation through reputation and without an external enforcer is an open question. We therefore explore through …-shot trust game with a reputation mechanism. In every interaction, a buyer has complete information about a seller's past … the one hand, some minimal fraction of buyers must make use of the sellers’ reputation in their buying strategies and, on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556684