This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on the firm performance for an unbalanced panel of 2478 Indian corporate firms from 1994 to 2000. We examine the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, institutional, and managerial ownership on firm performance. Using panel data...

A recent merger “wave” has occurred within the economy, including the agricultural sector. Some research has been conducted on publicly traded companies, but there is little information available on merger activity within agricultural cooperatives. This paper presents the results of a recent...

Corporate governance (CG) studies have mostly focused on highly dispersed corporations. However, there is an important need for research exploring the governance structure of family-owned firms. The main characteristics that distinguish the family firm from the other types of corporations are...

In recent years the number of going private transactions has sharply increased in emerging markets. The purpose of this study is to establish the financial characteristics of companies that have gone private using a dataset comprising of Polish companies. We use a probit model to distinguish the...

This study investigates the firm financing patterns in India and the role of corporate governance mechanisms. We use firm-level time series data of nearly 2000 listed companies from 1994 through 2000, to analyze the firm’s corporate financing behavior in connection with its corporate...

This paper investigates the association between the corporate governance and the dividends payout policy for a panel of Indian corporate firms over the period 1994-2000. We explain the differences in the dividend payout behavior of the firms with the help of firm’s financial structure,...

This paper works with a broad data sample of Czech voucher-privatized firms during 1996 - 1999. It analyzes the development of ownership structure and consequently its effect on a firm's performance Ownership concentration had been quite high in 1996 and steadily increased. The single largest...

External agents are frequently characterized as necessary for efficiency in team production settings. At the same time, these agents must be constrained from opportunistically exercising their enforcement capabilities. I argue that collective action costs and formal institutions (e.g., golden...