We study the effect of market structure upon international trade policy when firms invest in process R&D before competing in a differentiated goods market. For a domestic monopoly, and increasing the number of foreign firms, the government either chooses a R&D (and output) subsidy, or remains...

This paper analyzes the incentives for governments to impose export subsidies when firms invest in a cost saving technology before market competition. Governments first impose an export subsidy or a tax. After observing export policy, firms invest in cost reducing R&D and subsequently compete in...

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game among finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot...

A monopoly selling in two countries can use exclusive or competitive retailers to distribute its product. A low wholesale price in one country might induce a retailer to resell the good for profit in the other country, generating thereby parallel imports which compete with the authorized sales....

We analyze the effects of a legally-binding price floor using Hotelling's model of locational competition. A moderate price-floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium of d'Aspremont et. al., by allowing firms to compete more aggressively for market share. Minimum differentiation...

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game among finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot...

We empirically test some implications from location theory using the location of Los Angeles area gasoline stations in physical space and in the space of product attributes. We consider the effect of demand patterns, entry costs, and several proxies for competition -- the total number of...

This paper studies steady-state, Markov-Perfect strategic trade policy when (infinitely lived) governments are committed to trade policy during two periods. We compare the case in which both governments choose their export subsidies in the same periods (synchronization) versus the case in which...

In this paper we discuss the incentives of a welfare maximizing government to implement strategic trade policy when there is, on the one hand, uncertainty about the relevant market information (like the type of competition, demand function, cost function, etc.), but, on the other hand, the...

We compare the social welfare generated by a domestic government in the two types of policy setups: a "commitment" regime in which the government sets its policy instrument before the strategic choice is made by the domestic firm and a "non-commitment" regime where the policy variable is set...