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Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?
Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 1999
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877
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"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games"
Lagunoff, Roger; Haller, Hans - EconWPA - 1997
This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in alternating move repeated games with two players. Such … attention on Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). These are Perfect equilibria in which individuals condition their actions on … payoff-relevant state variables. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550884
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An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example
Oechssler, Jorg; Schlag, Karl - EconWPA - 1997
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927
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Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
Haller, Hans; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 1999
This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the … number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550934
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Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001
equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938
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Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle
Echenique, Federico - EconWPA - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556698
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False Reputation in a Society of Players
Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997
Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541
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Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities
Echenique, Federico - EconWPA - 2000
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal …-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I … introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407571
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Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games
Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997
We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601
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" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "
Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001
(lexicographically) costly, all protocols admit only equilibria that sustain stage Nash equilibrium payoffs. We also analyze a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603