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Endogenous Market Thickness and Honesty : A Quality Trap Model
Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha - EconWPA - 2004
Many emerging or transition economies lack institutional arrangements (like ISO certification) to credibly signal product quality. The absence of such institutions leads to low levels of market activity with poor quality products on sale. In this paper, we use a dynamic framework with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412865
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I ranking internazionali come rimedio alle asimmetrie informative negli sport individuali: il caso del ciclismo professionistico
Tondani, Davide - EconWPA - 2005
a model of signaling, this paper shows that in individual sports, the mechanism of rankings as that introduced in … the signaling mechanism implemented in professional cyclism since 1989 induced a process of convergence of main sponsors …. Applicando un modello di signaling, questo articolo mostra come negli sport individuali i ranking di merito, come quelli …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561829
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Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring
Bhaskar, V.; Damme, Eric van - EconWPA - 1998
We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407576
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``We sold a million copies''-The role of advertising past sales.
Monteiro, P. K.; Moraga, J. L. - EconWPA - 1998
We model a two periods market with two-sided quality uncertainty. In the first period the seller gathers information about consumers' tastes upon observing his sales. In the second period the seller may or may not deliver the information. If the monopolist must commit either to reveal or conceal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412930
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Monopoly intermediary and information transmission
Quesada, Lucia; Peyrache, Eloic - EconWPA - 2003
In this paper we extend Lizzeri's simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561385
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Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?
Miller, Ross M. - EconWPA - 2002
between buyers and sellers, such as found in Akerlof’s lemons model and Spence’s signaling model and extends the arguments put … all qualities together (lemons) or using external indications of quality to separate them (signaling). Similarly, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125589
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Inventory Signals
Lai, Richard Kum-yew - EconWPA - 2005
whether it is because of poor or smart operations. We hypothesize that inventory has a signaling role. In our model, publicly … the assumptions behind this inventory signaling hypothesis: (1) the market cannot tell the difference between “good” and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413245
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Advertising, Pricing & Market Structure in Competitive Matching Markets
Bataille, Edner; Julien, Benoit - EconWPA - 2005
This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment with capacity constrained sellers. Sellers' expenditure on directly informative advertising attracts consumers only probabilistically. Consumers who happen to observe advertisements randomize over the advertised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076903
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information
Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2002
Consider an auction in which $k$ identical objects are sold to $nk$ bidders who each have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it. Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and bidders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078
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Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma
Lagerlof, Johan - EconWPA - 2002
Suppose an altruistic person, A, is willing to transfer resources to a second person, B, if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents' point of view. This is the Samaritan's dilemma. The logic of the dilemma has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077070