We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...

This paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.

Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the...

This paper applies the technique of Granger Causality to determine the relationship between total government expenditures and total tax revenue using annual revised estimates. The analysis discovers a firm unidirectional effect from expenditure to revenue suggesting the preference of controlling...

There is an established theoretical and empirical case-study literature arguing that environmental pressure groups have a real impact on pollution levels. Our original contribution to this literature is to provide the first systematic quantitative test of the strength of environmental...

In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...