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Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity
Gailmard, Sean; Patty, John W. - EconWPA - 2005
job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity in the bureaucracy. In addition, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076581
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Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media
Suphachalasai, Suphachol - EconWPA - 2005
equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect production and …This paper investigates the relationship between a bureaucracy and mass media industry, and its implications to … corruption. We develop a bureaucratic model of corruption with mass media. A representative profit maximizing media firm seeks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560959
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Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making
Boehmke, Frederick J.; Gailmard, Sean; Patty, John W. - EconWPA - 2005
which multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s own in-house development … – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560982
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Negative Stereotypes and Willingness to Change Them: Testing Theories of Discrimination in South Africa
Aguero, Jorge - EconWPA - 2005
This paper proposes a new test to distinguish between the two leading theories of discrimination: preference versus information. Discrimination based on preferences occurs when people behave as if they refuse to change their stereotypes about the capabilities of discriminated individuals. Those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076553
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The Amsterdam Auction
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - EconWPA - 2002
Auctions used to sell houses often attract a diverse group of bidders, with realtors and speculators out for a bargain competing against buyers with a real interest in the house. Value asymmetries such as these necessitate careful consideration of the auction format as revenue equivalence cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077067
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Is playing alone in the darkness sufficient to prevent informational cascades?
Fiore, Annamaria; Morone, Andrea - EconWPA - 2005
Models of herd behaviour and informational cascades were theoretically developed in 1992 respectively by Banerjee (A simple model of herd behavior) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades). Both articles pointed out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124961
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Equilibrium PLay and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games
Biel, Pedro Rey - EconWPA - 2005
In a laboratory experiment, subjects played ten two-person 3x3 constant sum games and stated beliefs about the frequencies of play by their opponents. Contrary to previous experimental evidence, game-theoretical predictions work well: 80% of actions coincided with Nash equilibrium, subjects were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125558
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Conditional cooperation and group dynamics: Experimental evidence from a sequential public goods game
Houser, Daniel; Kurzban, Robert - EconWPA - 2003
We design a novel sequential public goods experiment to study reciprocity, or conditional cooperation. In contrast to the standard simultaneous contribution game, our sequential design provides direct evidence on how subjects condition their own contributions on the contributions of other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125562
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Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jorg - EconWPA - 2003
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the models to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125578
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When Curiosity Kills the Profits: an Experimental Examination
Jamison, Julian; Karlan, Dean S. - EconWPA - 2005
Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125581