The objective of this work is to try to define and calculate the optimal growth path, in the presence of exogenous technical change, without resorting to the discounted-sum criterion. The solution suggested is to consider an optimality criterion expressing an anonymous intergenerational...

This paper explores the role of group heterogeneity in collective action among forest communities in northwestern Himalayas. Based on data from 54 forest communities in Himachal Pradesh, India, this paper finds that heterogeneity has at least three dimensions: wealth, social identity and...

This paper studies the Pareto-optimality of the consensual optimum established in 'Intergenerational anonymity as an alternative to the discounted-sum criterion I: consensual optimality'. For that, a Pareto- optimality criterion is set up by the application of the generalized Karush, Kuhn and...

In this paper we analyze the effects of wealth inequality on the provision of public goods and management of common-property resources (CPR) when there are market imperfections in inputs that are complementary in production to the collective good. We show that for public goods inequality impedes...

Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems are proved using a common proof strategy based on a dictatorship result for choice functions. One of the instrumental results obtained shows the inconsistency between the basic assumption in each of these theorems and a mild majority principle.

In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow's Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow's axioms...

Allocation rules map preference profiles into allocations, whereas trading rules map preference profiles and allocations into allocations. It is shown that no allocation rule can derive from a trading rule based on voluntary trade and satisfying a weak efficiency condition. If the trading rule...

It is known that, in Condorcet’s classical model of jury decisions, the proportion of jurors supporting a decision is not a significant indicator of that decision’s reliability: the probability that a particular majority decision is correct given the size of the majority depends only on the...

Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and...

Market clearing is the central issue in macroeconomics. Two centuries of debate on Say’s Law indicates that the issue is not yet settled. This essay proposes that double coincidence is a necessary condition for market clearing, in addition to the equality of demand and supply at equilibrium...