In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation...

This paper shows the impact that investment in infrastructure may have on the efficiency of agricultural products markets. Using daily price series for the most important agricultural crop in Peru (potato), in 10 cities from 1995 to 2001, we show that there is enough evidence to conclude that...

This paper argues that scarcities for non-transferable fixed-supply goods such as land, infrastucture and social capital, may affect European unemployment in two, mutually enforcing, ways. Firstly the existence of minimum non-transferable capital requirements per worker implies that in a growing...

This article provides a cognitive foundation of the parameters that regulate a model of the learning curve. Organizational learning and its actual occurrence are linked to the number of available categories and to the amount of information to be processed.

The design of the agricultural reform in Bulgaria in the early 90-es provides researchers with a natural experiment for testing the effect of the protracted absence of clearly defined property rights on economic outcomes. Special rules governing the restitution of orchards made one group of...

External agents are frequently characterized as necessary for efficiency in team production settings. At the same time, these agents must be constrained from opportunistically exercising their enforcement capabilities. I argue that collective action costs and formal institutions (e.g., golden...

In this paper, I study industry-university relations in a principal- agent framework. Following the existing literature, these relations are interpreted in two ways: (1) as occurring through spillovers of knowledge among different groups of researchers, working for different institutional...

We study optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A ''selfish'' employer can profitably exploit preferences for equity among his employees by offering contracts which create maximum inequity off-equilibrium and thus, leave employees feeling...

Market gardening has been increasing fast in Senegal. But farmers face high marketing risks: daily price fluctuations exceed an average 20% for some products, seasonality is strong, anticipation based on prices leads to cyclic movements. Farmers and market operators have found various forms of...

This paper distinguishes between governance structure and contractual form. The basic premise is that researchers often confuse these two concepts when they develop or empirically test models within the transaction cost framework. In the paper I utilize a simple principal- agent model to show...