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Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions
Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2005
This paper studies dynamic, endogenous institutional change. We introduce the class of dynamic political games (DPGs), dynamic games in which future political aggregation rules are decided under current ones, and the resulting institutional choices do not affect payoffs or technology directly. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062355
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Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions
Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2005
This paper examines existence of Markov equilibria in the class of dynamic political games (DPGs). DPGs are dynamic games in which political institutions are endogenously determined each period. The process of change is both recursive and instrumental: the rules for political aggregation at date...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407586
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Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism
Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001
equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is … fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938
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An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example
Oechssler, Jorg; Schlag, Karl - EconWPA - 1997
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927
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The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1995
Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407564
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Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - EconWPA - 2003
can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete … breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third … cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation, i.e., by kin selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413263
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Cooperation and Punishment
Thomas, Jonathan P.; Evans, Robert - EconWPA - 2000
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513
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The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities
Frijters, Paul; Tieman, Alexander F. - EconWPA - 1999
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of pre … if mutually connected individuals with sufficient combined punishment potential have signalled their willingness to form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412451
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Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model
Tieman, Alexander F.; Houba, Harold; Laan, Gerard van der - EconWPA - 1998
We consider a local interaction model with a population on an h dimensional torus, in which in each round of play a random player gets a learning draw. This player plays a k+1 action stage game with players in his neighborhood, compares his own average payoff with the average payoff of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118616
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Social norms and human cooperation
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004
norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review … insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076756