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The Effects of Consumer Protection on Sales Signs, Consumer Search and Competition

Wilson, Chris M. - EconWPA - 2005

-order’ monitoring can actually facilitate the deception of fully rational consumers, to deter them from otherwise optimal search …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412887

L’expérimentation en économie et en psychologie: une comparaison méthodologique.

Marc, Ohana - EconWPA - 2004

L’objet de ce travail est de souligner les divergences qui ont amené les expérimentateurs en économie à se démarquer de la méthodologie expérimentale introduite par les psychologues. Après avoir rappelé en quoi consiste une expérience de laboratoire et quels sont les principes de...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126094

The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology

Ortmann, Andreas; Hertwig, Ralph - EconWPA - 2002

counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this … discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of … deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407572

Seeking information: the role of information providers in the policy decision process.

Swank Otto H. - EconWPA - 2000

The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. Those who are capable of providing information to policy makers often have a vested interest in the outcomes. This gives them an incentive to distort information to manipulate policy decisions. In this article we argue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125873

Cheap Talk Revisited: New Evidence from CVM

Aadland, David; Caplan, Arthur J. - EconWPA - 2003

Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings. We further investigate the ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a CVM phone survey administered to over 4,000...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407824

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlof, Johan N.M. - EconWPA - 2005

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412896

Professional Advice

Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter - EconWPA - 1999

Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550867

A Model of Expertise

Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John - EconWPA - 1999

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550962

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender …We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670

Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information

Gossner, Olivier; Melissas, Nicolas - EconWPA - 2004

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes thruthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118611