This paper uses properties of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence to compute Nash equilibria in nite games. It is shown that branches of the correspondence may be numerically traversed e ciently and securely. The method can be implemented on a multicomputer, allowing for...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for $k$ periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

This paper surveys a selection of the literature on the private provision of public goods using the Kolm triangle. (The Kolm triangle is the analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good.) We provide simple geometrical proofs of various established results using this graphical...

This paper characterizes the properties of equilibrium location patterns in an Anderson-Neven-Pal model and uses these characteristics to comprehensively find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria, most of which are not yet found in the literature. Since the external competition effect may be...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two- player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny (1999) and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy $\varepsilon-$equilibria for all epsilon0. We show by examples that there are: (1)...

A social game is a generalization of a strategic-form game, in which not only the payoff of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by their opponents, but also their set of admissible strategies. Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in social games with continuous...

The paper provides a theory of interest rates determination in the informal credit market in backward agriculture highlighting the interactions between two informal sector lenders (a professional moneylender and a trader-interlocker) and explains the prevalence of different interest rates in the...

This paper builds a model of fragmented duopsony in backward agriculture following Basu and Bell (1991) in which the purchasers (traders) have captive markets each but compete in a contested market. We focus on the formation of captive markets through trader-farmer interlinkage in the form of...

The paper provides a theory of interest rates determination in the informal credit market in backward agriculture highlighting the interactions between two informal sector lenders (a professional moneylender and a trader-interlocker) and explains the prevalence of different interest rates in the...