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Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions

Posner, Richard; Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999

Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions for violation of a norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral- costly, and multilateral-costly. Problems in creating and enforcing norms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076640

Social norms and human cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076756

Third-party punishment and social norms

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the …’’ third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125599

The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1995

Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407564

Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?

Nikiforakis, Nikos - EconWPA - 2004

group when antisocial behavior is observed. In many circumstances, however, we can not allow for punishment and exclude the … possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment based on Fehr and Gaechter (2000) where we allow … for both punishment and counter-punishment. We find that in both Partner and Stranger treatments average contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408219

Altruistic Punishment in Humans

Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - EconWPA - 2003

show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation …. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We … show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413255

Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - EconWPA - 2003

This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish non-cooperators. We call this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413263

When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non- Cooperation

Houser, Daniel; Xiao, Erte; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon - EconWPA - 2005

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and researchers have pointed to both 'intentions' and incentives as sources of this effect. This paper reports data from a novel experimental design aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556667

Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting

Rigdon, Mary - EconWPA - 2005

Principals can attempt to get agents to perform certain actions preferable to the principal by using ex post}punishments and rewards to align incentives. Field data is mixed on whether, and to what extent, such informal incentive contracting (paradoxically) crowds out efficient solutions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556679

An Economic Approach to Adultery Law

Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 2000

who initiates punishment, whether punishment is just a transfer or has real costs, who gets the transfer or pays the costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126038