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For infinite societies, Fishburn (1970), Kirman and Sondermann (1972), and Armstrong (1980) gave a nonconstructive proof of the existence of a social welfare function satisfying Arrowfs conditions (Unanimity, Independence, and Nondictatorship). This paper improves on their results by (i) giving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412477
We study how individuals divide themselves into coalitions and choose a public alternative for each coalition. When preferences have consecutive support and coalition feasible sets are positively population- responsive, the proposed consecutive benevolence solution generates allocations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062349
Many local public goods are provided by coalitions and some of them have network effects. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a coalition with more members. This paper adopts the Drèze and Greenberg (1980) type utility function where players have preferences over goods as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550914
This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118600
This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is gdescribable.h The gdescribableh...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125912
In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy gtops only.h That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, . . . , or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125938
Since the internet have become popular to the public, a new simulation method, which involves a large number of people … in the simulation process, has been enabled. In this paper, a macroeconomic data collection simulator on the internet …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134571
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134969
A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that for buyer-size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062721
We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062725