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Price-Capping Regulation as a Protectionist Strategy in Developing Countries

Lawrence, Peter; Mukherjee, Arijit - EconWPA - 2002

. Counter-intuitively, we further discover that lobbying for regulation is to be expected where the incumbent firm is relatively … of protection. Strategic lobbying by such firms for a price-capping regulatory regime is, under certain conditions, one … possible for the profit of the incumbent to be greater under regulation which deters entry than under unregulated duopoly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561376

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

Lagerlof, Johan; Frisell, Lars - EconWPA - 2004

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076613

Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring

Dakhlia, Sami; Pecorino, Paul - EconWPA - 2005

In the standard model of a rent-seeking contest, firms optimally employ resources in an attempt to win the contest and obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some fixed, exogenous per-unit cost. In many real-world rent-seeking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077062

Corruption and Political Competition

Damania, Richard; Yalcin, Erkan - EconWPA - 2005

special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest … turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135118

Environmental Pressure Group Strength and Air Pollution: An Empirical Analysis

Binder, Seth; Neumayer, Eric - EconWPA - 2003

There is an established theoretical and empirical case-study literature arguing that environmental pressure groups have a real impact on pollution levels. Our original contribution to this literature is to provide the first systematic quantitative test of the strength of environmental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407808

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

Lagerlof, Johan; Frisell, Lars - EconWPA - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413244

Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying

Boylan, Richard - EconWPA - 1998

Interest groups lobby over a variety of issues including private bills. There are two striking facts about private bills introduced in the U.S. Congress. First, several scandals have involved Congressmen who were being bribed to introduce a private bill. Second, the number of private bills...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556927

Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Boehmke, Frederick J.; Gailmard, Sean; Patty, John W. - EconWPA - 2005

Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560982

New Labor Legislation in Montenegro – Labor Law and Proposal of the General Collective Agreement

Krsmanovic, Ana - EconWPA - 2004

A key area of focus in the economic reform process and the design of a favorable business environment is labor market legislation. Montenegro has obviously failed in this area. After nearly 13 years since the beginning of the transition process, or five years since the beginning of Economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076510

The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax

Buckley, Francis; Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999

There is a secret paradox at the heart of social contract theories. Such theories assume that, because personal security and private property are at risk in a state of nature, subjects will agree to grant Leviathan a monopoly of violence. But what is to prevent Leviathan from turning on his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076588