We study the emergence and coexistence of monetary and credit transactions in a model where exchange is decentralized. Agents belong to different villages which are informationally separated. The frequency of meetings between any two different villages decreases as their respective geographic...

In environments with no commitment and with a need for intertemporal trade, bounded recall is shown to be a sufficient friction for a receipt system (fiat money) to lead to improved allocations in an otherwise frictionless Walrasian model. The absence of other frictions makes price determination...

I study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria, one of which involves a banking panic. The analysis is built on a repeated version of the Diamod-Dybvig (1983) model. The optimal (run free) equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also "risk...

We introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which we identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse,...

We revisit the question of price formation in general equilibrium theory. We explore whether evolutionary forces lead to Walrasian equilibrium in the context of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games have Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some, and possibly...

Within the framework of Diamond-Dybvig (1983), the optimal (run free) outcome is shown to be the unique forward induction equilibrium. In a version of the model that posits Bertrand competition among banks, there are sequential equilibria that imply positive profits. However, the zero-profit...